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Attracting  attention  is  a  basic  feature  of  economic  life  but  no  standard  economic 
problem. A new theoretical model is developed which describes the general structure of   
competition for attention and characterizes equilibria. The exogenous fundamentals of an 
attention economy are the space of receiving  subjects with their attention capacity, and  the  
potential  set  of  competing  companies  (senders)  with  their  radiation technologies.  The  
endogenous  variables  explained  by  the  theory  are  equilibrium audiences (the clients 
belonging to a company), their signal exposure and attention, and the  diversity  of  senders  
surviving  the  contest  for  attention.  Application  of  the equilibrium analysis to changes in 
information technologies and globalisation suggests that international integration or range-
increasing technical progress may decrease global diversity.  Local  diversity,  perceived  by  
the  individual receivers, may increase nonetheless. 
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Suppose you had an idea but nobody except you is aware of it. Then, you and your idea 
don’t exist in the scientific community. Descartes￿ cogito ergo sum, hardly applies to the 
real world. The case is only what is perceived. And for being perceived one has to 
attract the attention of recipients. The importance of being perceived and having impact 
is not only common experience in an economist’s life but a basic feature of the 
(economic) world in general. To attract the attention of people is a prerequisite for 
doing profitable business as well as for winning elections and shaping society. It 
follows from the fact that only those ideas, goods, persons, firms matter, which are 
perceived. The purpose of this paper is to reflect this fact in an adequate theoretical 
model and to analyse its economic consequences. 
 
What determines the set of items we perceive and why does the diversity of perceived 
objects change? ￿  Suppose you are a reader of economic articles. Apart from your 
interests, you have individual characteristics like brain capacity or distractions by non-
economic stuff. They put a limit to your processing of economic literature. Thus, you 
focus attention on important sites and outlets of publications. And important is who 
produces many powerful papers and gets the attention of the science community or, 
more generally, of the ensemble of producers and consumers of scientific work. Range 
and diversity of the important agents and places on which this ensemble focuses have 
changed over time. In particular, some local heroes have become global heroes and 
other local heroes have disappeared at all. Obviously, the circle that producers try to 
attract attention and consumers pay attention to producers who send powerful signals is 
not bound to scientific research but applies to many economic goods and services from 
simple things like clothes to entertainment and high-tech products. It determines the 
agenda of public debates as well as the actually relevant choice sets on our mind as 
economic agents. 
 
Teachers (or parents) always have told the children to be attentive. And the teachers 
have been told that good teaching requires do attract the audience’s attention. The new 
thing is that managing attention and attracting attention are becoming universal maxims 
in business and economics. An account of the many current trends of attention 
management and the practical implications for doing business was recently presented by 
Davenport and Beck [2001] under the title "The Attention Economy".
1 The title 
indicates that the issue of attracting attention really adds a new dimension to an 
economy. Herbert A. Simon pointed out that in an information-rich world a new 
scarcity problem arises, namely: "a scarcity of whatever it is that information 
consumes." According to him, what information consumes is obvious: "it consumes the 
attention of its recipients. Hence a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention" 
(Simon [1971], p. 40). Whereas Simon focussed on the question how economic agents 
can allocate their attention capacity efficiently among information sources, the focus of 
                                                 
1   See there for references on the psychological, technological and commercial backgrounds of the role 
of attention in business and management. The first version of this paper was written 2001 before I 
have got knowledge of their book. That I independently chose almost the same title underlines that 
the subject is topical. My interest in it was raised by the art journal Kunstforum, whose December 
1999 issue focussed on "Ressource Aufmerksamkeit" (see also Goldhaber [1997] and Frank [1998]). 
Shapiro and Varian [1999] discuss business strategies for attracting attention by customizing 
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this paper is the contest of information sources for the attention of recipients in 
anonymous markets. Under this focus the central question is which and how many 
information sources succeed in getting enough attention to be viable. Put differently: 
Given that the agenda of people is crowded, who and what is on the agenda if an 
overabundant set of potential items compete for being there.
2 For answering this 
question, an economy is considered as a system of subjects (senders) who try to attract 
the attention of other subjects (receivers) by producing and distributing information 
packages (signals). The senders may be firms, news agencies, scientific networks, 
political parties etc., promoting products, persons or ideas under some logo. They are 
addressed also as companies or firms in this paper, since they typically consist of more 
than one individual. (However, the interior structure of companies is not considered.) 
The receiving subjects, on whom the signals are targeted, are called audiences. The 
central question to be answered is then: What is an equilibrium outcome if each 
company tries to attract the attention of subjects by exposing them to the signal "Look at 
me" or "Read my message"? As a result, we get characterizations of which companies 
survive the contest for attention and how big is their impact. 
 
Although there is much economic jargon when people talk about attention, closer 
examination quickly shows that standard economic notions like supply, demand and 
exchange at the market price cannot be simply applied to attention as just another 
economic good. Attention is a prerequisite of any economic transaction. Before subjects 
can value and choose items they must get aware of them. This involves an interaction 
between producers and consumers beyond the exchange of specific products and 
contents.
3 The essential dimension in this "meta-interaction" is how many units of a 
receiver’s attention capacity, e.g. time, are absorbed by signals targeted on her or him. 
To say that attention is a scarce resource means: The exposure of subjects to signals is 
so strong that having an impact by absorbing part of their attention capacity requires to 
send strong signals and to target them on audiences with relatively unexhausted 
perception capacity. In an attention economy many potential senders compete for 
attention in this way. This paper provides a formal description of the fundamentals of 
such an economy and a characterization of what is an equilibrium. Despite the abstract 
character of the model quite concrete predictions follow from the comparative-static 
analysis of equilibrium. 
 
The key features of the model are: An attention economy is modelled as a family of 
senders, which employ costly signals to attract the attention of audiences and have an 
impact on them. An audience is a set of receivers characterized by their attention 
capacity. The attention capacity, formally represented by a relationship between 
stimulus exposure and attention level of an individual, constitutes one of the exogenous 
                                                 
2  Scarcity of attention capacity has not only implications for individual behaviour or business 
strategies but also consequences for the (equilibrium) outcome in markets or in the whole economy. 
To stress this aspect I use the label "attention economies" rather than "economics of attention" for 
addressing the subject of this paper.  
3  Also trash absorbs attention capacity before you can scrap it. As is well known, the purchase of 
information can never be based on perfect information. But even recognized noise, destroying the 
possibility to focus on other things, cannot always be turned off. This is an important difference 
between the problem of attention economies and Rosen’s [1981] "Economics of Superstars", where 
consumers have a choice between services of different quality and their willingness to pay for a unit 
of service is higher if the service comes from a more talented producer.   Attention  Economies  4 
 
fundamentals of the economy.
4 The other set of fundamentals describes the exogenous 
properties of potential senders. Each sender is characterized by its radiation capacity or 
range, which measures the maximal size of the audience that can be addressed. This 
allows us to deal with the fact that more or less local or global companies are competing 
for the attention of audiences. It is not required that the audience of a sender is a 
connected area or neighbourhood of receiving subjects. This complicates the formal 
structure of the presented model but is essential for an appropriate analysis. The 
prototype sender in an attention economy is not an emitter of electromagnetic waves 
covering a fixed geographic area. Modern techniques allow those who want to attract 
attention flexible targeting of their signals on attentive individuals. The location of the 
targeted receiver is of minor importance, or of none if we think of the Internet. 
 
Given their capacity to address audiences of a certain size, the economic agents in 
search for attention can choose the targeted audience and the strength of the signals they 
focus on them. The purpose of attracting attention is to have an impact. And the impact 
of a sender is the bigger, the stronger the signal produced by the sender and the higher 
the level of attention of the targeted audience. Attention levels depend on the receivers’ 
attention capacities and on the total volume of signals to which they are exposed. Single 
senders have zero measure and take attention levels as given when making their 
choices. The senders’ simultaneous pursue of impact together with the individuals’ 
attention capacity determine equilibrium signal exposure, equilibrium attention levels 
and equilibrium allocations of audiences to senders. Of course, audiences can overlap 
and an individual is typically a member of several audiences. This gives us a measure 
for the diversity of senders experienced by an individual. I call this the local diversity, 
since it varies across individuals with different attention characteristics. By contrast, the 
global diversity is given by the total measure of senders which survive in the 
equilibrium of the attention economy by achieving impact. Usual economic analysis 
concentrates on the specific choices out of the varieties that are available. Under that 
focus, diversity is closely related to interpersonal differences in tastes and talents as 
emphasized in Rosen [2002]. The following analysis points to another important aspect 
of diversity. Items that are not promoted powerfully enough, to be viable in the contest 
of attention, are not part of the choice set.
5 In the presented model equilibrium diversity 
is determined by attention capacities and radiation power.  
 
The comparative-static analysis shows how changes in methods of impact generation or 
radiation capacities affect equilibrium signal strengths, attention levels and the measure 
of viable companies. As a main result, it is shown that an increase in the range of 
radiation, allowing to companies a wider diffusion of their signals, may diminish the 
equilibrium set of companies in the economy although each receiving subject has access 
to more varieties of senders than before. In other words, global diversity may decrease 
while a higher local diversity is experienced. The reason is that different local audiences 
turn into more homogeneous global audiences. Natural applications of this result on the 
                                                 
4  Psychology or neurosciences tell us how people perceive signals and process information. Moreover, 
they may give advice how to concentrate and use our brain capacity optimally. Here the individual’s 
perception psychology and attention capacity are taken as given. 
5  Even ideas or products that would be appreciated by all consumers ￿ if they were aware of them ￿ 
may not be viable since consumer attention is distracted to more powerful signals. In personal 
relationships you may be able to force others to listen, but in an anonymous market an audience of 
positive mass must be reached. This is impossible with radiation limited to personal relationships.  Attention  Economies  5 
 
impact of extended radiation range are technical innovations like the Internet. 
According to evidence reported by Graham [2001], the number of sites that attract large 
shares of the time spent online substantially dropped in recent years. This doesn’t mean 
a reduction of information received by the surfers, to the contrary. But more surfers 
focus on the same set of information sources. Apart from information and 
communication techniques, institutional restrictions may prevent senders from 
exhausting their radiation capacity by addressing for instance foreign audiences. 
Deregulation, in particular international integration, is thus another example to which 
the comparative-static result on the impact of an increase in the range of radiation can 
be applied. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: In section II the general structure of attention 
economies is formalized. Section III determines equilibrium allocations of audiences to 
given families of senders. Section IV analyses the choice of signal strength in the 
contest for attention and characterizes equilibrium level of signal exposure and 
attention. In section V the equilibrium family of senders surviving in the contest for 
attention is derived and comparative-static results about equilibrium diversity are 
presented. Section VI summarizes. 
 
 
II.  The structure of an attention economy 
 
An attention economy consists of two types of agents: The companies sending signals to 
earn attention, and the receivers exposed to the signals. The exogenous fundamentals of 
the economy are the space of receivers together with their attention capacity and the 
space of potential senders together with the feasible audiences. I present first the space 
of receivers and the space of senders.  
 
 
II.1  Senders and audiences 
 
Let all potential receivers be given by a set of subjects S. The potential audiences for 
senders are given by subsets  AS ⊂ .
6 Examples of potential audiences are the set of 
Internet users with certain surfing characteristics, the subjects on the mailing list of a 
marketing firm, the set of subscribers to a broadcasting company or to the NBER 
working paper series. For a theatre company, the audience is located in a geographical 
space with a clear measure for the distances between actors and visitors. If less tradi-
tional media are used for attracting attention, the potential audiences have more 
complex structures. Visitors of web sites are scattered all over the world and companies 
may be interested in targeting their signals at isolated islands. Therefore, the length or 
the radius of some neighbourhood around a sender cannot characterize the size of an 
audience. A natural way to deal with this problem is to represent the space of receivers 
by a measure space (S, A, µ ), where A is a σ -field of measurable subsets of S and µ  
is a measure on A. Every element of A is a subset  AS ⊂  representing a potential 
audience. The size of the audience is given by the measure  () A µ . It is assumed that µ  
is finite. The following analysis focuses on contests for attention in competitive envi-
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ronments. One requirement for competition is that there are many potential audiences 
for whose attention the companies can compete. In particular, it should be possible to 
pick also small sets of receivers. Formally, the following divisibility assumption is 
made: For any  A∈ A with  () 0 A µ >  and any constant  () 0 cA µ <<  there exist B∈A 
so that  () B c µ = . (Take, for instance, the σ -field of Borel sets in a real interval S  and 
the Lebesgue measure.) 
 
Senders are the economic agents, for instance firms, who want to attract the attention of 
audiences. Let  ] (0,L  be the index set of potential senders in the economy. Thus, 
t∈ ] (0,L  is the name ("logo") under which a company, a scientific network or any other 
attention-seeking agent conveys information (signals) to receivers. In general, not all 
potential senders will be active. Actually, it is the purpose of the following analysis to 
determine the subset  ] (0, TL ⊂  of companies surviving the competition for attention. 
The idea of a perfectly competitive contest for attention requires that single companies 
have zero measure. It is assumed that the potential sets of active senders are Lebesgue-
measurable. That is, the space of senders is given by  ] ( () 0, , , L λ B  where B, λ  are the 
σ -field of Borel sets in ( ] 0,L  and the Lebesgue measure, respectively. Every element 
of B is a subset  ( ] 0, TL ⊂  representing a possible family of active senders.  () T λ  
measures its size. 
 
Each potential sender  ] (0, tL ∈  is endowed with a radiation capacity. The radiation 
capacity is characterized by a real integrable function  ( ] :0 , L ρ ++ → R .
7  () t ρ  describes 
the maximal audience size (range) that can be addressed by company t. It is assumed 
that the senders are ordered according to their size, that is, ρ  is non-increasing. 
Radiation capacity  ρ  determines the set of feasible audiences. Formally, this will be 
made precise in the next section. In reality, the maximal size of audiences that a 
company can handle depends on two factors: the available media and the resources 
attributed to the management of receiver relationship. Obviously, new media have 
dramatically changed the range of attention-seeking senders. Ceteris paribus, a larger 
audience can be addressed through the Internet than by phone calls. In general, such 
technological changes are exogenous to the single company. Also the means for 
entertaining the communication channels to the receivers, for instance the 
organizational infrastructure for maintaining mailing lists or evaluating the impact of 
distributed information on the addressed audience, are fixed in the short-run. The 
following analysis assumes that capacity  () t ρ  is an exogenously given characteristic of 
sender t. The comparative-static analysis of the impacts of changes in ρ  on the diver-
sity of companies and their impact on the receiving subjects will be an important part of 
the equilibrium analysis in section V.  
 
                                                 
7   ,, RR R ++ +  denote the sets of real numbers, non-negative real numbers, positive real numbers, 
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Whereas range ρ  is exogenous, senders can choose their signal strength. This is the 
means by which a company attracts attention and which absorbs attention capacity of 
receivers. For any given set T ∈B of senders, signal strength is represented by real 
integrable function  : T T σ + → R . For every  () , T tT t σ ∈  describes volume and inten-
sity of the information sent to the members of the audience of t, for instance, the 
number of mails to clients per period, or the loudness or conspicuousness of the 
transmitted signals. Production of signal strength is costly and the produced signals are 
sent to all members. Companies incur the cost for earning attention and achieving 
impact. This optimisation problem and the implied equilibrium signal exposure is 
analysed in section IV. 
 
 
II.2 Audience  allocations 
 
The interaction of senders and receivers depends on which subjects are attracted by 
which companies. For characterizing the possible outcomes in an attention economy we 
must describe the assignment of receivers to companies. From the perspective of a 
signal sending company the question is which audience is reached by its signals. From 
the side of the receiving subjects the question is to which set of companies they pay 
attention. I call the assignment of audiences to senders an audience allocation. 
Formally, an audience allocation for a set of senders, T ∈B, is given by a relation 
T TS ⊂× a , where  T a  is measurable  × BA . ( × BA  is the product space with measure 
λµ × .) If a pair () , ts is element of  T a , then sender   t addresses subject s under 
audience allocation  T a . Thus, for any tT ∈ , the section  () () { } :, TT ts S t s =∈ ∈ aa  of 
T a  defines the audience receiving the signals sent by t. From the perspective of a 
receiver  s S ∈ , the section  () () { } ,: , TT Ms t Tt s =∈ ∈ aa  of  T a  describes the set of 
perceived companies. I call  () , T Ms a  the membership of s under  T a . Note that 
T a ∈× BA  implies that  () , T Ms a  and  () T t a  are measurable B  and A , respectively. 
Not all audience allocations are feasible. The audience assigned to an active company 
must have positive measure and cannot be larger than the company’s radiation 
capacity () t ρ . Nor can it be larger than  () S µ , the measure of all subjects in the 
economy. Since modern technologies have a very large range I don’t want to exclude the 
case that senders have the capacity to cover the whole economy (i.e.  () ( ) tS ρµ ≥ ). In 
sum, an audience allocation  T a  for T ∈B is feasible under radiation capacity ρ  if for 
all  tT ∈ :  () () 0 Tt tr µ <≤ a , where  () ( ) { } :m i n , t rS t µρ = . The fact that only the size 
of audiences is limited by the radiation technology has far-reaching implications. It 
means that audiences of companies need not be connected areas or neighbourhoods in a 
geographical space. This would be the case if, for instance, a sender would have a fixed 
focus like a cone of light. In contrast to this, according to the given notion of feasibility, 
companies can target their signals fully flexibly, provided the targeted audiences are not 
larger than what they can handle by their given capacity. I think this is the adequate 
modelling of the media channels through which modern companies disseminate and 
promote information to anonymous audiences. 
  Attention  Economies  8 
 
Membership  () , T Ms a  gives us a measure for local diversity under aT . In an economy 
in which audience allocation aT   is realised,  () () T , Ms λ a  measures the variety of 
companies perceived by subject s. By extending the notion to sets of subjects  A∈A, we 
can describe the variety of companies perceived in A by  () T ,: MA = a  
() { } T ,  for  some   tTt s sA ∈∈ ∈ a . Then,  () T , MS a  describes the total variety of 
companies perceived somewhere in the economy. By definition,  () , T M ST = a  for any 
feasible  T a . I call  () ( ) () , T TM S λλ = a  the global diversity under  T a .
8 It puts an upper 
limit to local diversity. If for many subjects  () () T , Ms λ a  is small compared to  () T λ , 
then the variety of companies perceived by different subjects is relatively heterogeneous 
across subjects. If for all s local diversity coincides with global diversity, every subject 
experiences the same set of companies. For instance, if T is the set of active scientific 
networks in the world and each subject of the scientific community is also a member of 
all  tT ∈ , then local diversity is equal to global diversity. There is a uniform 
international scientific community paying attention to the same set of paper series etc. If 
many networks tT ∈  have only local membership, then local diversity perceived by a 
member of a local scientific community is small compared to the global diversity, 
which is experienced by a subject moving around through all local communities. 
 
 
II.3  Attention, signal exposure and impact 
 
The basic characteristic of subjects in their role as receivers in an attention economy is 
not taste or choice behaviour but the attention capacity. An agent may be in a more or 
less attentive state. If (s)he is more attentive (s)he processes the received information 
more carefully. On the one side, this capacity depends on individual psychological 
factors, which can vary from individual to individual since people are heterogeneous 
with respect to their abilities to concentrate. This ability may be the result of some self-
management regarding a person’s mental resources or time. In this analysis, it is taken 
as an exogenous individual characteristic. On the other side, the attentiveness of an 
individual with given psychological characteristics is also influenced by the strength 
and volume of signals to which she or he is exposed. People may almost fall into a doze 
if there is little stimulus. And they typically loose concentration when signal exposure is 
above a certain level. More generally, the attention level of a subject s S ∈  depends on 
subjective characteristics but also on the environment of s, i.e. on the signal strength 
T σ  chosen by the active set of companies T  and the prevailing audience allocation  T. 
This can be represented by a positive real function  () , TT ϕ σ ⋅ a  on the space of 
receivers. It is assumed that for all  T, T σ a  function ϕ  is measurable and bounded (see 
lemma 1 for a characterization of such functions). The function models the attention 
                                                 
8    Note that for all  A  for which  () , T MA a  is measurable  () () , T MA λ a can be seen as diversity 
function in the sense of Nehring and Puppe [2002], since  () () { } , TT MA t t A =∩ ≠ ∅ aa  and 
() () ,aT
M
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capacity of subjects. It assigns to every subject s S ∈  the attention  level 
() , TT s υϕ σ = a  of s when living in an economy with audience allocation  T    and signal 
strength  T σ . It is important to keep in mind that attention capacities are exogenous 
individual characteristics whereas attentive levels endogenously depend on environment 
, TT σ a . However, not all variations in the audience allocation or of signal strength 
matter. Any given  T a , T σ  induces for s S ∈  a certain total signal exposure given by the 




d σ λ ∫
a
 over all senders to which s is exposed. This 
total signal exposure is the relevant factor for a subject’s attention level under  , TT σ a . 
Therefore, the following assumption is made with respect to the properties of the 
attention capacity. 
 
Assumption AN (Anonymity). For all s S ∈ , if  ,, TT T σ a  and  ,, TT T σ ′′ ′′ ′ a  induce the 
















, then also the induced 
attention level is equal, i.e. () , TT s ϕ σ a  =  () , TT s ϕ σ ′′ ′′ a . 
 
The assumption stipulates an anonymity property. The identity of the signal-sending 
source is irrelevant for the concentration of a subject exposed to signals. Only their 
strength matters for the absorption of attention capacity. Therefore, the attention level is 
invariant with respect to audience allocations leading to the same signal exposure. 
Assumption AN allows us the following characterization of attention capacities. 
 
Lemma 1. ϕ  satisfies AN if and only if there exists a measurable bounded function v: 




d τ σ λ = ∫
a
. 
Proof. Appendix  
The crucial mathematical point in the proof of lemma 1 is that signal exposure  s τ  is a 
measurable function. The important economic assumption is AN. It allows the 
characterization of attention capacities by a function of signal exposure only. The 
attention level resulting when a subject with attention capacity v is exposed to an 
environment  s τ , is denoted by the variable υ . In the further analysis, AN is always 
assumed and, as a rule, representation  () , s vs τ  is used for describing attention 
capacities. 
 
For various results of the paper, a further property of the attention capacity is required. 
It gives a precise meaning to the vague idea of attention as a scarce resource.  
 
Assumption DA (Declining Attention). Attention capacities represented by  () , s vs τ  
satisfy DA if for all s S ∈  there is a threshold  0 s τ
+ ≥  so that  ()() ,, s s vs vs τ τ ′ <  if 
ss τ ττ
+ ′ >≥.  
  Attention  Economies  10 
 
This assumption expresses the fact that too much signal exposure stresses people and 
destroys their concentration. The threshold  s τ
+  above which increasing signal exposure 
is harmful for a subject’s level of attention can be different for different subjects.  
 
There remains one element to be specified. By definition, in an attention economy 
companies send signals to earn the attention of receivers and to have an impact on them. 
Obviously a receiver can pay more attention if (s)he is concentrated, i.e. if her or his 
attention level is high. And a given attention level will more likely be focussed on a 
sender if the sender increases its signal strength, whereas a company of which no signal 
is perceived has no impact at all. Thus, the impact of tT ∈  with strength  () T t σ  on a 
receiver with attention level  () 0 υ >  is given by a measurable non-negative bounded 
real function  () () , tT zt συ , which is zero at  () 0 T t σ = , increasing in  () T t σ  and, for 
() 0 T t σ > , also increasing in υ . (Later, for some results, additional concavity and 
differentiability properties will be imposed.)  t z  describes how signal strength and atten-
tion generate impact. Attention level υ  is the only receiver characteristic which matters. 
There is no personalized interaction and apart from their attentiveness receivers are 
exchangeable. Note however that impact function  t z  can vary across companies. The 
same signal strength may generate different impact for different types of senders. ( T σ  
comprises only that dimension of transmitted information which absorbs attention 
capacity. Any other aspects, which may be relevant for impact, for instance the used 
medium or the clarity of t’s presentation, are captured by  t z .) Whereas the input 
variable  () T t σ  in impact function  t z  is chosen by company t, the attention level 




d τ σ λ = ∫
a
, on which single companies have no influence since they have zero 
measure.
9 Since the signals of company t reach all members of audience  () T t a , the 
total impact of tT ∈  under  T, T σ a  is given by 






Vz t v s d s σσ τ µ = ∫
a




d τ σ λ = ∫
a
. Since v and  t z  
are non-negative, measurable and bounded, the integral exists (note  () S µ <∞).  
 
 
II.4  Behaviour and equilibrium 
 
Receivers react to signal exposure according to their exogenously given attention 
capacity v.
10 In the contest for attention, the active role is played by the senders. They 
                                                 
9   Formally, 
() ( ) ,,
sT T
Ms Ms TT




 for  { } TTt ′ =−  and  () () TT tt ′ ′′ = aa  for all tT ′′ ∈ . 
10  Although the psychological processes behind v are taken as a black box, v is a rich box. Only very 
general properties are imposed by assumption AN and DA so that a wide variety of behavioural 
phenomena is covered. For instance, v may decline very sharply if changes in  , TT σ a  lead to an  Attention  Economies  11 
 
choose signal strength σ  and select the audience of subjects at which their signals are 
targeted. The decision of an active sender about signal strength is a standard cost-
benefit calculation. (It is assumed that the production of signal strength is costly 
whereas the diffusion of the signals is costless within the radiation capacity defined by 
range  ρ . Setting up and running the radiation technology may imply fixed costs, which 
limits the set of active companies.) The selection of the audience is based on the 
following reasoning: As long as there is a choice between more or less attentive 
receivers, the impact of information can be increased by targeting it on subjects with 
higher attention. This requires that companies are able to observe the attention level of 
subjects. In a strict sense this is only possible with direct attention-monitoring methods 
evaluating brain waves or eye-ball movements. Although such methods exist and are 
further developed ￿ Davenport and Beck [2001, p. 49] speak of the "Wire’em up 
principle" ￿ observable proxies for the attention of audiences are more realistic. Media 
watch, download statistics, speed and frequency of response, self-reported data on 
attentiveness are examples. 
 
For a given set of active companies, equilibrium is reached if a feasible audience 
allocation is realized, all companies choose their optimal signal strength and no 
company has an incentive to retarget its signals to more attentive audiences. The 
equilibrium set of active firms is determined by a viability condition. This condition 
will be derived from the premise that impact is the central determinant of the value of a 
sender. Therefore, only those companies survive which achieve a non-negative value of 
impact (net of the cost for generating the impact). By characterizing the properties of 
equilibrium sets of active companies, T , and of equilibrium allocations of audiences, 
T   , we are able to assess the global and local diversity experienced in an attention 
economy by looking at  () T λ  and  () () T , Ms λ a , respectively. Moreover, we can 
provide explanations for changes in equilibrium signal exposure and equilibrium 
attention levels. 
 
The further analysis proceeds as follows. In a first step, the properties of equilibrium 
audience allocations are determined for a given set of companies T with signal strength 
T σ . It will be shown that under quite general conditions the attention level of subjects is 
uniquely determined by aggregate signal imission  () : tT
T
X rt d t σ =∫ , 
() ( ) { } min , t rS t µρ = . In a second step, I analyse, for a given set of senders T  with 
aggregate signal level  X , the optimal choice of signal strength 
*
t σ  of a single sender 
tT ∈ . Then I determine the equilibrium values of  , T X σ  which are consistent with this 
choice. In the third step, I determine the size of equilibrium set 
* T  of companies which 
achieve sufficient impact to survive in an attention economy and describe the 
characteristics of companies in 
* T . The results are used for characterizing the effects of 
changes in the technology of impact production or in the feasible range of radiation on 
sender diversity and attention level of receivers. 
 
                                                                                                                                              
increase in signal exposure. Subjects possibly concentrate on a certain amount of information and 
neglect the rest more or less.  Attention  Economies  12 
 
 
III. Equilibrium  allocation  of  audiences 
 
Given a set of senders, T ∈B, with signal strength  T σ . Each company tT ∈  can reach 
an audience of measure  () () () ( ) { } min , Tt tr S t µµ ρ ≤= a . Depending on which 
feasible audience allocation is actually realised, total impact of t is  () T, tT V σ a . Suppose 
that there is another feasible audience allocation  T ′ a  under which company t would 
achieve a higher impact. Then t clearly would prefer  T ′ a  to  T a . However, a single 
company hasn’t the power to decide about which audience allocation is realised in the 
economy. It can only chose its own audience, i.e. the set of receivers  A∈A  on which 
the produced volume of signals,  () T t σ , is targeted. Thus, for tT ∈ , a deviation from an 
audience allocation  T a  to another audience allocation  T ′ a  is feasible if  T ′ a  results from 
T a  by exchanging  () T t a  through  () T t ′ a  and leaving all other audience assignments un-
changed. This leads to the following definition of an equilibrium allocation of 
audiences. 
 
Definition 1. For T ∈B with  T σ , let  T a  be a feasible audience allocation. 
(i)  An audience allocation  T ′ a  is a feasible deviation from  T    for tT ∈ , if  T ′ a  is a 
feasible audience allocation and  () () TT tt ′′ ′ = aa  for all  { } tT t ′∈− . 
(ii)  T a  is an equilibrium audience allocation if for no tT ∈  there is a feasible 
deviation  T ′ a  from  T a  with  () () ,, tTT tTT VV σσ ′ > aa .  
 
Whenever a company has an opportunity to increase its impact by retargeting its 
signals, the company will use the opportunity. It will skip less attentive receivers and 
use the radiation capacity to address subjects on which the produced signals have a 
higher impact. If audiences are allocated to senders in a way that offers no such 
opportunities, no company is interested in changing the audience allocation. If subjects 
have very heterogeneous attention capacities, it cannot be excluded that some of them 
are not covered at all, that is, no company targets its signals on them. Others may be 
fully covered by all companies. Let  () { } :, T Us M s == ∅ a , and 
() { } :, T F sM s T == a  be the (possibly empty) sets of uncovered and fully covered 
subjects, respectively. The following proposition characterizes the attention levels of 
covered and uncovered subjects in an equilibrium audience allocation. 
 
Proposition 1. For T ∈B with  0 T σ >  (i.e.  () 0 T t σ >  for all tT ∈ ), let  T a  be a feasible 
audience allocation.  
If  T    is an equilibrium audience allocation, the following conditions hold: 
(a) For  all  tT ∈ :  () ( ) ,, s s vs vs τ τ ′ ′ ≤  for almost all  () , T s Us t ′∈∈ a . 
(b)  ()( ) ,, s s vs vs τ τ ′ ′ ≤ , for almost all  , s SFsF ′ ∈− ∈.  Attention  Economies  13 
 
(c) For  υ ++ ∈  , let  () { } :, s Ss v s υ τ υ
− =< ,  () { } :, s Ss v s υ τ υ
+ =≥ . For all tT ∈ : If 
() () 0 T tS υ µ
− ∩≠ a , then  () () 0. T St υ µ
+ −= a  
(d) For  all  tT ∈ :  () () Tt tr µ = a .  
If  T a  satisfies conditions (c) and (d) then  T a  is an equilibrium audience allocation. 
Proof. Appendix 
 
The proposition provides necessary and sufficient conditions for an equilibrium. An 
immediate consequence of the sufficient conditions is that any audience allocation with 
equalized attention levels and fully utilized radiation range is an equilibrium. 
 
Corollary 1.  T a  is an equilibrium audience allocation if  ()( ) ,, s s vs vs τ τ ′ ′ = , for almost 
all  , s sS ′∈ , and  () () () ( ) { } min , T tS t µµ ρ = a  for all tT ∈ . 
Proof. Equal attention levels imply condition (c), and (d) holds by assumption.  
 
The necessary conditions imply that, apart from extreme cases, attention levels must be 
equal, as the following discussion of conditions (a) ￿ (d) shows.  
 
Condition (a) says that only the least attentive subjects are possibly not addressed by 
any company, that is, are uncovered by T . Since they would pay less attention than 
other audiences, no company would wish to retarget its signals on them. In contrast, 
condition (b) deals with subjects which are in the focus of all companies. Such 
receivers, if there are any, must have a very high attention capacity. Despite full 
exposure (to all tT ∈ ), their attention level is at least as high as the attention level of 
subjects which are not fully covered by T  (i.e. for which  () , T Ms a  is a proper subset 
of T ). Condition (c) is the most interesting one. Any company which has people with 
relatively low attention level among its receivers (i.e. for which  () () 0 T tS υ µ
− ∩≠ a ) 
almost surely has also all receivers with higher attention in its audience 
() () () 0 T St υ µ
+ −= a . Only a company that has exhausted all subjects with relatively 
high attention is willing to target its signals also on less attentive receivers. The 
alternative would be to leave part of the radiation capacity unused. But this would be no 
equilibrium, as stated by (d), since additional receivers, if they are feasible, always 
increase the total impact of a sender. If T  contains enough small companies (i.e.  () t ρ  
is small relative to the measure  () S µ  of receivers), their chase after attentive audiences 
tends to equalize attention levels. To see this consider an audience allocation with two 
subject pools  , AA ′∈A . Some companies target their signals on  A, others on  A′ or on 
both sets. Small companies with  () ( ) ( ) { } min , tA A ρµ µ ′ <  can fully utilize their 
capacity by concentrating on one set. As long as attention levels are high in one set and 
low in the other, small companies can always switch to the more attractive subjects. If 
there are many such companies, signal exposure and attention levels change. The 
retargeting process only stops when attention levels in the two sets are equal or if all 
companies have switched to the more attentive audience. But the latter implies that this 
audience consists of an elite whose attention capacity is so high that they process any  Attention  Economies  14 
 
volume of signals better than others. The following corollary proves this intuitive 
argument. (A set U ∈   A is said to be almost completely uncovered if  () () 0 T Ut µ ∩=   a  
for all tT ∈ . And F ∈   A is almost fully covered if  () () 0 T Ft µ −= a  for any tT ∈
11.) 
 
Corollary 2. If heterogeneity of radiation capacities is limited, in particular if 
() ( ) tt ρρ ρ ′ =≡  for all tT ∈ , then in any equilibrium allocation  T a  one of the 
following three conditions must be satisfied: 
(a)  ()( ) ,, s s ss ν τν τ ′ ′ =  almost everywhere or 
(b)  there exists an almost fully covered set of receivers with positive measure or 
(c)  there is a set of almost completely uncovered subjects with positive measure. 
Proof. Appendix 
 
The restriction on  () t ρ  used in the proof is that either all senders have a radiation range 
exceeding a certain size or all of them are smaller than this size. This is a sufficient 
condition for the result, not a necessary one. The corollary makes no restriction 
concerning heterogeneity of attention capacities. In sum, under quite general 
circumstances, in an attention economy in which all subjects are covered by some but 
not by all senders, attention levels are equal in an equilibrium allocation of audiences. 
Obviously, they may be equal in other circumstances as well, for example, if all subjects 
have identical attention capacities and are fully covered. The further analysis 
concentrates on audience allocations with equalized attention levels. 
 
The following example describes a class of economies for which an equilibrium 
audience allocation with equal attention levels can be constructed explicitly.  
 
Example 1. For  , 0 T T σ > , let heterogeneity of senders be restricted by the assumption 
that there is a finite partition  () ,1 , , , 0 kk Tk K T λ ∈= < … B   () T λ <  with  () k t ρρ =  
and  () Tk t σσ =  for  k tT ∈ . Sender capacities satisfy the following divisibility condition: 
Senders in class k  either cover all subjects (i.e.  () k S ρµ ≥ ) or the subject space can be 
properly divided among them (i.e.  () / k S µρ  is an integer). Moreover, suppose that 
receivers’ attention capacities  () , s vs τ  are given by a function  () ( ) , s s fv s τ τ =  almost 
everywhere. 
 
Fact 1. For attention economies satisfying the properties of example 1, an equilibrium 
audience allocation exists with  () () , T Ms λ = a   () () / kk
k
TS ρλ µ ∑ ,  s τ τ =  and 
                                                 





∩   ∪  over an uncountable T  may have positive measure even if  () () 0 aT Ut µ ∩=    for 
any t. Moreover,  ()0 F µ =    implies  ()0 F µ =  but not vice versa.  Attention  Economies  15 
 
()() ,, s vs f τ τ =  almost everywhere, where  kk
k
r τσ =∑ () () / k TS λµ ,  
() { } min , kk rS µρ = .  
Proof. Appendix 
 
In the proof of fact 1 a concrete audience allocation is constructed satisfying the 
properties of equilibrium. Other audience allocations can fulfil these properties as well. 
However, the construction of the equilibrium audience allocation suggests that in any 
equilibrium audience allocation with equal attention levels, the equilibrium attention 
level is uniquely determined by average signal imission  () () / kk k
k
rT S σλ µ ∑ . (Note 
that  kk r σ  is signal imission implied by sender k  who spreads  k σ  over range  k r . And 
() kk k
k
rT σλ ∑  is aggregate signal imission.) The following proposition shows that 
under DA this is generally the case for equilibrium audience allocations with equalized 
attention levels, i.e. for allocations  T a  which satisfy  () () Tt tr µ = a ,   , tT ∈  and 
()( ) ,, s s vs vs τ τ ′ ′ =  for almost all  , s s′. 
 
Proposition 2. For  , 0 T T σ ∈> B  define  () tT
T
X rt d t σ =∫ . Under DA, there exists a 
decreasing real function  () υ i  so that for any equilibrium audience allocation  T a  with 
s s τ τ
+ ≥  for almost all s the following holds: If attention levels are equal under  T a , then 




Assumption DA and  s s τ τ
+ ≥  mean that signal exposure in the economy is sufficiently 
strong to make scarcity of attention relevant. If this is the case, in any equilibrium 
audience allocation with equalized attention levels the equilibrium attention level of 
almost all receivers is uniquely determined. There may be multiple equilibrium 
audience allocations. But the equilibrium attention level of receivers is given by  () X υ  
which is independent of the signal strength  () T t σ  of a single sender  { } () () 0 t λ = . 
Hence, each sender tT ∈  can take the attention level of its receivers as given when 
deciding about signal strength. This decision and the implied equilibrium signal strength 
are analysed in the next section. 
 
 
                                                 
12   Like in all other statements  () S µ  is fixed throughout the analysis. If  () S µ  changes, a different 
function  () υ i  is relevant. In general, the comparative-static effects of changes in  () S µ  are 
ambiguous. But if attention capacities are identical as in example 1, equal attention levels imply 
() / s X S ττ µ == . Then the equilibrium attention level is a function of  () / X S µ . At the end of this 
paper this fact is used to illustrate possible consequences of international integration in an attention 
economy (see discussion of fact 3).   Attention  Economies  16 
 
IV.  Contest for attention and equilibrium signal exposure 
 
The question solved so far was: Given a set of companies T with signal strength  T σ , 
what are the properties of equilibrium audience allocations under  , T T σ . This leaves 
open the questions: (i) Which sets of companies are equilibrium sets, and (ii) which 
signal strength do companies choose to have an optimal impact on their audience? In 
this section the second question is answered. Given an audience allocation  T a  for T ∈ 
B, what are equilibrium choices  () , T tt T σ ∈ ? 
 
In an attention economy, the essential performance measure is impact. Formally, the 
impact of t sending with strength σ + ∈R  on a receiver with attention level υ  was 
modelled as  () , t z συ . The attention level υ  of a subject depends on the environment to 
which it is exposed. It is given by  () , s vs τ  where signal exposure  s τ  depends on the 
given audience allocation  T a  and on signal strength  T σ . The total impact achieved by t 






Vz v s d s στ µ = ∫
a
. A single company 
has no influence on  s τ  since it has measure zero. Thus, any tT ∈  can take  () , s vs τ  as 
given when deciding about its signal strength. 
 
Impact has economic value since only those who earn attention of audiences are in the 
trade, i.e. have a market, make money or earn reputation. Suppose that  t z  is some 
physical measure of t’s impact like frequency of citations or time spent on signals 
coming from t. Let the economic value of  t z  be given by some measurable function 
() tt z π . If  t π  is bounded and monotonously increasing starting at 
() () 00 , tt t t z z ππ ==    satisfies all properties that have been required from impact 
functions in section II.
13 Thus, provided one accepts the idea that economic 
performance is positively related to impact, it can be assumed without loss of generality 
that  t z  and thus  t V  measure the economic value of impact rather than impact in the 
physical sense. 
 
It is assumed that production of strength σ  requires resources. But the dissemination of 
σ  to an audience is free, provided that the audience can be handled with t’s radiation 
capacity  () t ρ . In view of modern technologies, this seems a reasonable assumption. 
Producing papers costs effort, sending them to a given mailing list is easy. Formally, for 
a company t the cost of exposing an audience  A of measure  () ( ) At µρ ≤  to signal 
strength 0 σ ≥  are given by a function 
 
  () () () , tt CA c σµ σ = , (4.1) 
                                                 
13    The class of measurable functions  :RR R t z ++ + + ×→ with  () ,0 t z συ =  for  0, t z σ =  bounded, 
increasing in σ  and, for  0 σ > , increasing in υ  is invariant under measurable transformations 
: t π ++ → RR  with  () 00 , tt ππ =  bounded and increasing.   Attention  Economies  17 
 
 
where  t c  is differentiable with  0, 0, tt cc ′′ ′ >≥  starting at  () 00 t c ≥ . This allows for 
possible fixed costs  () 00 t c >  and falling average costs. They may arise from setting up 
signal production or distribution capacity, i.e. the capacity to address audiences of size 
() t ρ . It is assumed that  t c  represents signal costs in units of the economic value of 
impact. Note that like impact function  t z  also signal costs are allowed to be t-specific. 
 
In equilibrium, each company chooses signal strength such that the net-value of its 
impact cannot be improved by choosing another strength. Let 
() () ()
()





Vz v s d s c σσ τ µ σ =− ∫
a
 be the net-value of impact of σ . Signal 
strength σ  is optimal for t under  , TT σ a  if  () ( )
nn
tt VV σσ ′ ≤  for σσ ′ ≠ . (Since t has 
measure zero no strategic aspects are involved in this choice.) 
 
Definition 2 (Equilibrium signal strength). For T ∈B, let  T a  be a feasible audience 
allocation. 
(i)  T σ  is an equilibrium under  T a  if, for all  () , T tT t σ ∈  is optimal under  , TT σ a . 
(ii)  , TT σ a  is an equilibrium for T, if  T a  is an equilibrium audience allocation for 
, T T σ , and  T σ  is an equilibrium under  T a .  
 
As shown in proposition 2 under quite general assumptions, in an equilibrium audience 
allocation  T a  with signal strength  T σ  attention levels of subjects are given by a 
decreasing function  ()() , s vs X τυ =  of aggregate signal imission  () tT
T
X rt d t σ =∫ . 
And sender tT ∈  has impact  () () () , tT z tX συ  on all subjects belonging to its audience 
() T t a . Since  () () Tt tr µ = a  in an equilibrium audience allocation, the value of total im-
pact  () , tTT V σ a  which is achieved by tT ∈  is given by  
  () () () , tt t T Vr z t X συ = . (4.2) 
 
According to (4.2), expanding signal strength  () T t σ  has a positive effect on company 
t’s reception for any given X. But if a set of companies with positive measure increases 
signal strength, then X increases, which has an external effect on other companies. 
Under the assumptions of proposition 2,  () X υ  decreases in  X  so that the external 
effect is negative.
14  t ignores this effect when deciding about the optimal  () T t σ . 
Determining equilibrium signal strength therefore requires two steps. First, one has to 
clarify which  () T t σ  is optimal for individual companies tT ∈  if aggregate signal 
                                                 
14    The idea to internalise such negative external effects is probably the reason why some people 
propose to impose a price on sending electronic mails. See Kraut, Sunder, Morris, Telang, Filer and 
Cronin [2002] for laboratory experiments on such proposals.  Attention  Economies  18 
 
imission is X. Second, one has to look for an equilibrium which satisfies 
() tT
T
X rt d t σ =∫ . 
 
Given (4.1) and (4.2), for each tT ∈ , the choice of optimal strength σ  is a standard 
optimisation problem  [] max tt Vc
σ
− . Since the innovation of this paper lies elsewhere, I 
want to keep this problem simple enough to apply differential calculus for deriving 
comparative-static results about the choice of signal strength. So far only boundedness 
of impact function  () , t z συ  was required. Moreover,  () 0, 0, t z υ =   t z  increasing in σ  
and, for  0 σ > , increasing in υ . From now on it is assumed that  t z  is twice 
























With this specification the outcome of the optimisation of signal strength is a 
monotonous function of audience size and attention level. 
Proposition 3. For  , T T σ  let  T a  be a feasible audience allocation with  () , s vs τ υ =  
almost everywhere. If cost and impact functions satisfy (4.1) and (4.3), respectively, 
then: 
(a)  A company’s optimal signal strength is given by a differentiable function 
() () ()
* , tT t σµ υ a  with 
*/0 t σµ ∂∂ >  and 
*/0 t συ ∂∂ ≥ . 
(b) For  all  tT ∈ , the maximal net-value of impact is given by a differentiable 
increasing function of  () () T t µ a  and υ . 
Proof. Appendix 
 
The next task is to characterize equilibrium signal strength. For this purpose two further 
purely technical restrictions have to be imposed on the functions representing attention 
capacities, signal impacts and costs. First, it is assumed that the space of receivers 
() ,, S µ A  is given by a real interval S  with A  the σ -field of Borel sets in S  and µ  
the Lebesgue measure. Moreover, it is assumed that for all s the function representing 
attention capacities,  () , vs τ , is differentiable with respect to τ . Secondly, it is assumed 
that impact and cost functions vary across t in a measurable way. Formally, for all  ,, συ 
the derivatives  () ,/ t z συ σ ∂∂  and  () t c σ ′  are measurable functions of t. (Note that this 
is trivially fulfilled if  , tt z c  are identical for all t.) These properties guarantee the 
following facts which are useful for the derivation of equilibrium signal strength. 
 
                                                 
15    These are sufficient conditions guaranteeing generally the existence of a positive optimal signal 
strength with comparative-static properties as required for an equilibrium. They need not hold in 
concrete examples, in which the solution can be calculated explicitly.  Attention  Economies  19 
 
Lemma 2. Function  () υ i  in proposition 2 is differentiable () /0 dd X υ < . Function 
() () () ()




With this preparation, equilibrium signal strength can be determined as follows: In an 
equilibrium audience allocation  () () Tt tr µ = a . Thus, according to proposition 3, 
optimal signal strength of tT ∈  is given by  ()
* , tt r συ . Since  t r  is an exogenous 
characteristic of t, argument  t r  can be omitted without loss of information. Thus, in the 
further exposition I write  ()
*
t συ  instead of  ()
* , tt r συ . Equilibrium signal strength  T σ  
must satisfy two conditions: It must be consistent with the optimal choice of individual 
companies, i.e.: 
  () ( )
*
Tt t σσ υ =  (4.4) 
for all tT ∈ . And  T σ  must be consistent with attention level υ . If the assumptions of 
proposition 2 are fulfilled, this attention level is given by a decreasing function  () X υ , 
i.e.: 
  () X υυ =  with  () tT
T
X rt d t σ =∫ . (4.5) 
(Lemma 2 guarantees that 
*
t σ  is measurable so that the integral defining X exists.) 
Combining the two conditions (4.4) and (4.5), we obtain the equation 
  () ,, T X ZX T r =  (4.6) 
with  () () ()
* ,, : 0 Tt t
T
Z XTr r X d t συ =≥ ∫  and  T r  denoting the function on T assigning to 
each tT ∈  range  t r . According to lemma 2,  /0 dd X υ < . Since 
*
t σ  is differentiable and 
non-decreasing in  , / 0 ZX υ ∂∂ ≤  so that equation (4.6) defines for each  , T Tr a unique 
equilibrium level  []
* , T X Tr  of aggregate signal imission. Together with (4.4) and (4.5), 
this defines also a unique attention level  [] ()
** :, TT X Tr υυ =  and a unique equilibrium 
signal strength  () ()
** * : Tt T t σσ υ = . The following theorem summarizes this important 
result.  
 
Theorem 1. Under (4.1), (4.3), the assumptions for lemma 2 and DA with  s τ
+  
sufficiently small for all s, in any equilibrium  , TT σ a  for T ∈B, in which attention 
levels are equalized, equilibrium signal strength 
*
T σ  and equilibrium attention level 
*
T υ  
are uniquely determined by T and  T r . 
Proof. Main text 
 
Assumption DA with " s τ
+  sufficiently small" means that receivers are strained by the 
prevailing signal exposure, so that their attention capacity is decreasing in the relevant  Attention  Economies  20 
 
range. For  0 s τ
+ =  this is always guaranteed. Uniqueness of 
*
T σ  and 
*
T υ  allows us to 
derive comparative-static properties of equilibria in an attention economy. Regarding 
the attention level induced by a given set of active senders we have the following result. 
 
Theorem 2. Under the assumptions of theorem 1: If  () ( ) tS ρµ <  and  () t ρ  increases to 
() () tt ρρ >    on a measurable subset  () 00 ,0 TT T λ ⊂< , then equilibrium attention 
*




An increase in the range of radiation, allowing a wider diffusion of signals, induces 
companies to increase their signal strength in competing for attention. The reason is that 
diffusion of signals has zero marginal cost so that the production of impact by 
addressing signals on audiences is subject to economies of scale. At the same time, 
there is a second effect leading to higher signal exposure of subjects even without such 
economies of scale at the company level. Any given signal strength reaches more 
subjects when the radiation range of a company is extended. As long as the set of 
companies doesn’t change, this necessarily means more overlap among audiences. For 
instance, if a national scientific network extends its range to the international level it has 
to address subjects belonging to other national or international communities. As a 
consequence, these subjects will be exposed to more publications. If signal exposure 
was high before, relative to the threshold  s τ
+  defined by DA, then the increased volume 
of signals will be perceived with less attentiveness. Of course, the described 
phenomenon isn’t specific to scientific communities. Info-stress and attention deficit are 
not uncommon. According to theorem 2, a responsible economic fundamental is the 
possibility to address larger audiences.  
 
The extension of the range of one company may wipe out other companies so that T, 
which up to now has been taken as given, changes. This brings us to the question of 
how equilibrium diversity is determined in an attention economy. This question is 
answered in section V. Before turning to this section, I want to illustrate theorem 1 and 
theorem 2 by the following example. 
 
Example 2. Suppose that T can be partitioned in K measurable sets  1,, K TT    with 
() k t ρρ =  for  k tT ∈ , where the divisibility condition of example 1 is satisfied. Like in 
example 1 let  () , s vs τ  be given by a non-increasing function  () s f τ . Moreover, for 
k tT ∈ ,  () 10
kk
t cc c σσ =+  for some constants  1 0
k
k cr <<  and, for  1 σ > ,  () , t z συ  
() () ln kk gh υ συ =+ , where  () () 1, 0 kk gh υυ ≥≥  for  0 υ > , and  0, 0 kk gh ′′ ≥≥  with 
one inequality holding strictly. (For  1 σ ≤ ,  () ,0 t z συ =  is assumed.) 
 
Fact 2. For any T satisfying the properties of example 2, (i) an equilibrium  , TT σ a  with 




kk k rg c συ = , 
()




11 ,, , ,, kK TT τ λλ ρρ ……  with  ()
* /0 k T τλ ∂∂ >  and 
*/0 k τρ ∂∂ >  if 




V. Viability and equilibrium diversity in an attention economy 
 
The notion of a competitive environment requires: Agents must be viable, and free entry 
is allowed. In an attention economy, in which it is vital to attract attention, a natural 
notion of viability is that companies achieve a non-negative net-value  0
n
t V ≥  from 
sending costly signals for having impact on audiences. Free entry means that companies 
can participate in the contest for attention if they want. 
 
For any single company the situation looks as follows: Given a set T ∈B of active 
companies, a feasible audience allocation  T a  and some signal strength  0 T σ > , the 
attention levels of subjects are  () , s vs τ  where  s τ  depends on  T a  and  T σ . For tT ∈ , 





,, tT s tT
t
z tv s dsc t στ µ σ − ∫
a
. I denote this value by  [] T,
n
tT V σ a . 
Company  tT ∈  is viable if  [] T,0
n
tT V σ ≥ a . Companies tL T ′∈− face the following 
entrance problem. If tT ′∉  participates by targeting  0 σ >  on an audience  A∈A, the 
set of active companies becomes  { } TT t ′′ =∪ . Since  { } () 0 t λ ′ = , this doesn’t change 
attention levels of subjects. Thus, t′ achieves maximal impact when picking an 
audience 
* A  with  () () () { }
* min , AS t µµ ρ ′ =  in such a way that  ()( ) ,, s s vs vs τ τ ′ ′ ≥  
for all 
** , s AsSA ′ ∈∈ − , and maximal net-value of impact when choosing optimal 
signal strength  () () () ( )
*
* argmax , , tt s t
A
zv sd s c σσ τ µ σ ′′ ′ =− ∫ . Denote by  []
* , tT T V σ ′ a  
the maximal net-value of impact  () () () ()
*
** ,, tt s tt
A
zv s d s c στ µ σ ′′ ′′ − ∫ , which t′ achieves 
when participating in the contest for attention in an optimal way. Company t′ is viable 
if  []
* ,0 tT T V σ ′ ≥ a . It definitely has an interest to enter if the achieved value is strictly 
positive. If  []
* ,0 tT T V σ ′ = a , it is indifferent,  with respect to entry. 
 
Definition 3 (Free entry equilibrium). Let () () ,, , ,, SL µ λ AB  be an attention economy 
with attention capacity v and radiation range ρ .  ,, TT T σ a  is a free entry equilibrium of 
the attention economy if  , TT σ a  is an equilibrium for T  (according to definition 2) and 
the following property is satisfied: For all  [] ,, 0 ,
n
tT T tT V σ ∈≥ a  and  []
* ,0 tT T V σ ′ ≤ a  
for any tL T ′∈−. ( [] ,
n
tT T V σ a  denotes the net-value of impact achieved by tT ∈  
under  , TT σ a .  []
* , tT T V σ ′ a  denotes the maximal net-value of impact which tT ′∉  could 
achieve when participating in the contest for attention.)  Attention  Economies  22 
 
 
The further analysis is restricted to economies in which attention levels are equalized in 
equilibrium. In such an economy, equilibrium signal strength and equilibrium attention 
level are uniquely determined for a given set T of active companies (see theorem 1). 
They are given by 
  () ()
** *










T X υυ =  with 
* /0 dd X υ <  (5.2) 
respectively, where 





X rt d t σ =∫ . (5.3) 
This implies that also the maximal net-value of impact achieved by a company tT ∈  is 
unique in an equilibrium for T.  
 
By definition, for any tT ∈  facing an equalized attention level υ , the net-value which t 
achieves when addressing a maximally feasible audience  with signal strength σ  is 
given by
16  () ()( ) ,: ,
n
tt t t Vr z c συ συ σ =− , where  , tt z c  satisfy (4.1), (4.3). The maximal 
net-value under υ  is  () ()
* ,
n
tt V συυ . Thus, in an equilibrium with equalized attention 
levels 
*
T υ , for every tL ∈ , the maximal net-value that can be achieved by t is 
  () ()
** * * ,
n
tt t T T VV συ υ ≡= () () () ()
** * ** , tt t T T t t T rz c συ υ συ − . (5.4) 
(Note that no single company has an impact on υ  and any company, tT ∈  as well as 
tL T ′∈−, is confronted with the same attention level υ ).
17 
 
Theorem 1 has shown for a given set of active companies T, that in an equilibrium with 
equalized attention levels the equilibrium level of attention is unique. The following 
theorem shows that in any free-entry equilibrium with equalized attention levels the 
equilibrium level of attention is unique.  
 
Theorem 3. For given fundamentals ( () ( ) ,,, , tt tz ctL S ρµ ∈  and attention capacities 
v) there exists a unique 
* υ ++ ∈   so that in any free-entry equilibrium  **
** ,,
TT T σ a  
full-filling the assumptions of theorem 1 (and thus (5.1) ￿ (5.4)) the equilibrium level of 
attention,  *
*
T υ , is equal to 
* υ . Also aggregate signal imission 




                                                 
16   So far function symbol 
n
t V  was used for  ()
n
t V σ or  [ ] ,
n
tT T V σ a  in a given context  , TT σ a . Now, the 
relevant context is captured by a single variable υ . For saving notation I use the same symbol to 
denote net-value as a function of σ  and υ . 
17    The notational distinction between  [ ] ,
n
tT T V σ a , for tT ∈ , and  [ ]
* , a tT T V σ  for tL T ∈−, is no 
longer necessary. Both values are given by  () ()
* ,
n
tt V συυ , where υ  is the attention level implied by 
, aTT σ .  Attention  Economies  23 
 
According to definition 3, for identifying a possible equilibrium set 
* T  of active 
companies we must check for which tL ∈  the values given by (5.4) are positive, zero, 
or negative. Since companies may differ in capacity  () t ρ , impact function  t z  or cost 
t c , it is not possible to compare them without further restrictions. In the following an 
ordering on the set of potential companies L is assumed. I call t more powerful (or 
stronger) than t′ under υ  if  () ()
**
tt tt rr συ συ ′′ > , i.e. if total signal imission coming from 
t is higher than from t′ when both companies send with optimal strength. The following 
monotonicity property says that stronger companies are also more valuable. 
Assumption M (Monotonicity). Heterogeneity of  () ,,, tt tz ctL ρ ∈ , is restricted in such 
a way that, for all  ()
* ,,
n
tt V υσ υ ++ ∈>     ()
*,
n
tt V συ ′′ if t is more powerful than t′ under 
υ  (i.e. if  () ()
**
tt tt rr συ συ ′′ > ).  
 
Power is represented by a high 
*
tt rσ , that means, by sending widely and loudly. To 
assume that this is valuable in terms of impact seems to be natural in an attention 
economy. Being small and decent doesn’t pay. Property M trivially holds if all potential 
companies have identical fundamentals so that no company is stronger than another. 
Also if they differ only in range  () t ρ  while having identical impact and cost functions, 
property M follows immediately from (5.4). But M is generally satisfied when the 
fundamentals of companies can be ranked in a clear way. I call t non-inferior to t′ if 
,/ /, tt t t rrz z σσ ′′ ≥∂∂ ≥ ∂∂ tt cc ′ ′′ ≤ .
18 If at least one inequality holds strictly, t is superior 
to  t′. Thus, t is superior if it has a larger range or if it is better in the sense of having 
higher marginal impact or lower marginal cost of signal production. The following 
lemma shows how this ranking of companies in terms of fundamentals implies a 
ranking in terms of power and value.
 
 
Lemma 3. Suppose that L can be ordered so that t is non-inferior to t′ if tt ′ ≤ . Then,  
(a)  t is more powerful than t′ if and only if t is superior to t′. 
(b)  If for all  , t υ  and  , / / tt tz z σσ ′ ′ ∂∂ ≥ ∂∂  implies  tt z z ′ ≥  and  tt cc ′ ′′ ≤  implies 
tt cc ′ ≤ , then property M is fulfilled.  
Proof. Appendix 
 
Part (a) shows that companies can be ranked according to their imission power if they 
can be ranked according to radiation capacity, marginal impact and marginal cost of 
signal provision. Part (b) shows that this ranking implies a ranking in terms of the net-
values of impact which can be achieved by the respective companies. For instance, if 
companies have different radiation capacities  () t ρ  but have access to the some 
technology for signal and impact production so that  t c  and  t z  are identical, then 
companies with larger range send more powerfully and achieve a higher net-value of 
impact. In an analogous way, a ranking according to power and net-value is possible if 
                                                 
18   Since  , tt z c  are functions of υ  and σ , the respective inequalities can hold locally or globally. In the 
following analysis only the local properties at  ()
*
t συ  are relevant. However, we make comparative-
static analysis with respect to υ .  Attention  Economies  24 
 
companies have access to the same radiation technology so that  () ( ) tt ρρ ′ =  for all 
, tt L ′∈ , but some of them have a cost advantage in signal production or an impact 
advantage in the sense that they achieve higher impact with the same signal strength. 
According to (b), a sufficient condition for M is that an advantage at the margin means 
also an advantage overall. 
 
Theorem 4. Let  **
** ,,
TT T σ a  be a free-entry equilibrium fulfilling the assumptions of 
theorem 1 (and thus (5.1) ￿ (5.4)). Under M,  
(a)  ()
* T λ  is uniquely determined by the fundamentals of the attention economy. 
(b) If  L can be ordered so that t is non-inferior to t′ if tt ′ ≤ , then: t superior to t′ and 
* tT ′∈  imply 
* tT ∈  and 
**
tt VV ′ > . (
*
t V  evaluated at the (unique) equilibrium 
attention level 
* υ .) 
Proof. Appendix 
 
Part (a) of the theorem is essential for comparative-static analysis about the 
determinants of equilibrium diversity. Even though in general there is no unique 
equilibrium set of active companies 
* T  and no unique equilibrium audience allocation, 
equilibrium attention 
* υ  and equilibrium measure  ()
* T λ  are uniquely determined. Part 
(b) of the theorem shows that if there is ex ante heterogeneity of potential senders, in an 
equilibrium those companies dominate which are large or have a better technology for 
impact production. They send more powerfully (see lemma 3) and survive the contest of 
attention. An immediate consequence of (b) is that 
* tL T ′∈−  cannot be superior to 
* tT ∈ . 
 
In the following comparative-static analysis  () S µ  and attention capacities are kept 
unchanged while the companies’ fundamentals change from  () ,, tt t t br z c ≡  to 
() ,, tt t t br z c =        , tL ∈ . I say that b   is a progress over b  on E∈B if b    and b  coincide 
on  L E −  and, for every tE ∈ ,  t b    is advantageous compared to  t b  in the following 
sense: For  , , tt tE rr ∈≥    ,/ tt t zzzσ ≥∂ ∂     /, t z σ ≥∂ ∂  , tt tt cc cc ′′ ≤≤     and at least one of 
the following properties hold:  , tt rr >    or  tt z z >    and  / / , tt zz σσ ∂∂ > ∂∂    or  tt cc <    and 
tt cc ′′ <   . In words, companies in E experience progress in radiation capacity or in impact 
or signal production.  
 
Theorem 5. Consider two (otherwise identical) attention economies with sender 
fundamentals  b  and b  , respectively. Assume that under b  as well as under b   
assumption M is satisfied. Let  **
** ,,
TT T σ a  and  ,, TT T σ        a  be free-entry equilibria for the 
respective economies satisfying the assumptions of theorem 1. Let  { }
**
0 :0 t Tt T V =∈ =  
be the (possibly empty) set of marginal companies under b . If b    is a progress over b  
on some 
* E T ⊂ ,  ()0, E λ >  then 
(a) 
* υ υ ≤   ,  Attention  Economies  25 
 
(b)  () ()
* TT λλ <   , if 
* υ υ =    or if  () 0 0 TE λ −> . 
(
* , υ υ    denote the respective equilibrium attention levels. Their uniqueness is guaranteed 
by theorem 3.) 
Proof. Appendix 
 
Equilibrium attention certainly does not increase (part (a)) and could only remain 
unaffected if senders vanish (first if-clause in part (b)). Regardless of whether or not the 
attention level declines, the measure of active senders is reduced if not all marginal 
senders are subject to the considered progress (second if-clause in part (b)).
19 The 
economic mechanism behind this result is as follows: If companies get access to a 
radiation technology allowing a wider range of receivers, to a more powerful impact 
technology, or to less costly signal production, they produce and distribute stronger 
signals. Since the increased signal exposure leads to a decline in the receivers’ attention 
level, other senders with weaker signals are no longer sufficiently perceived to achieve 
viable impact. From the point of view of receivers, this means that the diversity of 
senders changes. However, the impacts on global and local diversity must be carefully 
distinguished.  
 
Global diversity addressed in theorem 4 and 5 is important from the perspective of an 
outside observer of the world. How many different senders ￿ i.e. producers and emittors 
of signals pointing to ideas, products, issues ￿ survive in a given attention economy? 
Why may small networks, local journals or national scientific communities vanish? By 
contrast to this global perspective, for every single receiver the experienced variety of 
senders is given by the measure  () () * ,
T Ms λ a  of the senders of which s is a member. I 
called it local diversity. By definition, for all s S ∈ ,  () *
* ,
T M sT ⊂ a  so that local 
diversity is limited by global diversity. Nonetheless,  () * ,
T Ms a  may increase for some 
or even all s even if  ()
* T λ  is reduced. To see this, note that each company reaches an 
audience of subjects whose measure is equal to the radiation range of the company. If 
this range increases, more subjects are in the range of the surviving companies. More 




mT S Ms d s µλ µ ≡ ∫ a  denote average local diversity 




rT T r d t λ ≡ ∫  denote average range. Since the measure of aggregate 
memberships is equal to the aggregate measure of audiences,
20 local diversity 
experienced on average is given by the equation  ()
* mT =  () () ()
** / rT T S λµ . 
Obviously, the effect of  () t ρ -changes on  ()
* mT  is ambiguous even if the effect on 
                                                 
19   Theorem 5 provides sufficient (not necessary) conditions for 
* υ υ ≤    and  () ()
* TT λλ <   . As example 
3 will show, also a uniform increase in radiation possibilities for all potential senders or international 
integration may lead to declining attention and diversity. In general, however, such changes have 
ambiguous effects. 
20   Set  1 T σ =   () () Tt tr µ = a in lemma A1, to get  () () () , Tt
ST
M sd s r d t λµ = ∫ ∫ a .  Attention  Economies  26 
 
()
* T λ  is negative. The following example illustrates that an increase of the radiation 
capacity of senders may lead to a decline in global diversity, while diversity 
experienced from the local perspective of every single receiver rises. Moreover, the 
example shows that ex ante-heterogeneity of potential senders is not a necessary 
requirement for the discussed comparative-static results.  
 
Example 3. Suppose that potential senders are identical with 
() ( ) 0 1, t tc c ρρ σ σ => =+ and  ()( ) ( ) ,l n t zg συ υ σ γ =+  if  1 σ > , where 
0 0, 0 1 c γ >≤ ≤  and  () 0 , gg
α υ υ =   0 ,0 g α ++ ∈>   . (Note that these are instances of 
the cost- and impact functions discussed in example 2.) Moreover, for all 
() ,, , 0 ss sSv s
β ττ β
− ∈= > . 
 
We know already that for such an economy an equilibrium with equalized attention 
levels exists for a given set TL ⊂  of active companies. (It is assumed that L is 
sufficiently large so that not all potential senders are active in an equilibrium.) 
Moreover, since all potential senders are identical, M is satisfied and thus, according to 
theorem 4, the measure  ()
* T λ  of active companies is unique in a free entry 
equilibrium. Both global and local diversity are characterized by the following fact. 
 
Fact 3. In an attention economy as described in example 3,  
(a)  Global diversity is given by  ()() ( ) 1/ *
0 Sr
αβ αβ λλ µ
− = , where  () { } min , rS µρ =  
and  0 λ  is a positive constant which is positively related to  0 ,g γ  and negatively 
related to  0 c . 
(b)  Local diversity is given by  () 1/ *
0 mr
αβ λ = . 
Proof. Appendix 
 
For the evaluation of comparative-static effects on equilibrium diversity two cases must 
be distinguished. If  ()
* , S µρ λ ≤  reduces to  ()
() 1/
0 S
αβ λµ  and 
** m λ = . If  () S µρ > , 
then r ρ =  and 
* λ  decreases (increases) with ρ  if  1 αβ >  (1 αβ ≤ , respectively). 
 
From an economic point of view the comparative-static analysis leads to important 
insights concerning effects of "globalisation" on diversity. Globalisation in an attention 
economy means that senders get access to a larger space of receivers. This can have two 
reasons: International integration or progress in the radiation technology. 
 
International integration is relevant if the radiation technology is sufficiently advanced 
so that audiences larger than the population of an isolated economy can be addressed. 
Integration allows to senders to exploit these possibilities. To see the effects on 
diversity, consider two identical economies with receiver set  () ,,
ii SS µ µ =  , iH F = . 
Senders have access to a radiation technology which allows them to cover more than 
i S , but not the whole world 
WHF SSS =∪ ,  () 2
W S µ µ = . This means, they have  Attention  Economies  27 
 
identical radiation capacities with  2 µρ µ << . Thus,  { } min , a r µρ µ ==  in the "closed 
economy" and  { } min 2 , W r µρ ρ ==  in the integrated world. Using this in fact 3, we 
obtain for equilibrium diversity in the closed economy:  () 1/ **
0 aa m
αβ λλ µ == . This gives 
for total diversity in the world: 
** 2 tot a λλ = . In the integrated world with cross-border 
radiation, equilibrium diversity is given by  () ( ) 1/ *
0 2 W
αβ αβ λλ µ ρ
− =  and 
() 1/ *
0 W m
αβ λρ = . Comparing autarky diversity with diversity in the integrated world, we 
get: 
**
Wa mm >  since ρµ > . Thus, local diversity experienced by an average receiver is 
larger under international integration than in a closed economy. However, with respect 
to global diversity the effect of integration is ambiguous. We have 
**
Wt o t λλ >  if 
()
() 11 / 1/
αβ µρ
− > . Since µρ <  was assumed, this implies 
**
Wt o t λλ >  if  1 αβ > . 
Although each subject is exposed to more different senders, fewer senders are active 
after integration. The reason is that senders have a radiation technology under which 
international radiation is feasible, and international integration allows full use of the 
radiation range. As a consequence, more subjects are exposed to the same senders and 
some senders are driven out of the market. 
 
The second source of globalisation in an attention economy is technical progress 
leading to an increase in the feasible range of radiation. To study the effect on diversity, 
suppose there is an integrated world with  ()
W
W S µ µ =  and identical senders whose 
range increases from  I ρ  to  II I ρρ >  where  I 1 W ρ µ <<  is assumed. Then, according to 
fact 3, diversity under range  I ρ  is given by  () ( ) 1/ *
0 IW I
αβ αβ λλ µ ρ
− = ,  () 1/ *
0 II m
αβ λρ =  
whereas under range  II ρ  diversity is  () ( ) 1/ *
0 II W II r
αβ αβ λλ µ
− = , 
*
II m = () 1/
0 II r
αβ λ  where 
{ } min , IIW I I I r µρ ρ => . Thus, again 
** , III mm >  and  ()
** **
III I II λλ λλ <≥  if  1 αβ >  





The presented theory explains the basic mechanisms at work in an economy in which 
earning attention and achieving impact are prerequisites of economic viability.  
 
The exogenous fundamentals are on the one side the space of receivers and their 
attention capacities, and on the other side the potential set of senders and their radiation 
and impact technologies. 
 
The endogenous variables explained by the theory are equilibrium audiences (the clients 
belonging to a company), equilibrium signal exposure and attention, and the measure of 
active senders in a free-entry equilibrium. Although there are multiple equilibrium 
allocations of audiences to senders, the signal strength, the attention level and the 
equilibrium measure of active senders can be uniquely characterized.  
 
Under the assumption that receivers are subject to disordered attention if exposed to 
high signal strength, the theory predicts that changes allowing to senders more powerful  Attention  Economies  28 
 
signal emission ￿ for instance, an extension of feasible radiation ranges, cheaper signal 
production, more effective methods of impact generation, but also international 
integration ￿ tend to decrease global diversity of senders and attention levels of 
subjects. Local diversity, measured by the variety of senders experienced by the 
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Appendix 
 
We prove first two lemmas which are important in several proofs. 
 
Lemma A1. For  , T T σ ,  , T TS ⊂× a  let  () () ( ) ,i f ,
,:








be the signal imission on s S ∈  from tT ∈  under  T a . For any  B A T ∈× a , 





td t σ ∫
a
 is a measurable function on S. 
(c)  ()
()









(a) Define  () ( ) , TT ts t σσ =   . For any  y + ∈  , the set  () () { } ,, T ts ts y σ >    = 
() { } T tt y S σ >×  is a measurable rectangle, since  T σ  is measurable B . Thus,  () , T ts σ    
is measurable  × BA . Since  () ,
T T bts I σ =   a , where 
T Ia  is the indicator function on  T a , 
also  () , bts is measurable  × BA . 
 
Properties (b) and (c) follow from Fubini’s theorem (see e.g. Billingsley [1995], p. 234). 
Note that  () , bts is non-negative. Moreover,  () ,
T




td t σ ∫
a
 and 
() ( ) ,
S




td s σµ = ∫
a
() () () , TT tt µσ a  since  () ,0 bts=  for 
() , T tM s ∉ a  or  () T s t ∉a . QED. 
 
Lemma A2. Suppose that  T a  is an equilibrium audience allocation for  , 0 T T σ > . Under 
assumption AN, if there exist sets  , AA ′∈A of positive measure so that 
()( ) ,, s s vs vs τ τ ′ ′ <  for all  , , s As A ′′ ∈∈  then:  () () 0 T At µ ′−= a  or  () () 0 T tA µ ∩= a , 
for all tT ∈ . 
 
Proof.  
Suppose that  () () 0 T At µ ′−> a  and  () () 0 T tA µ ∩> a  for some tT ∈ . The divisibility 
assumption imposed on () ,, S µ A  implies that  () T At ′−a  and  () T tA ∩ a  contain 
measurable subsets B′ and B , respectively, with  () ( ) 0 BB µµ ′ => . Let  T ′ a  be the 
audience allocation resulting from  T a  when  () T t a  is replaced by 
() () () : TT tt B B ′′ =− ∪ aa . Since  () () () () () , TT T tt t µµρ ′′ =≤ aa a  is a feasible 
deviation for t. We show that it is also attractive for t to deviate from  T a  to  T ′ a . If t  Attention  Economies    A2 
retargets its signals from  () T t a  to  () T t ′ a , then for s B ∈  membership changes to 
() () { } ,, TT M sM s t ′ =− aa , whereas for s B′ ∈  membership changes to 











 for all s S ∈ . Thus, according to assumption AN, 
() , TT s ϕ σ a  =  () , TT s ϕ σ ′ a  for all s S ∈ . (For the sake of clarity, I use here the 
representation of attention capacities which explicitly refers to the audience allocation. 
See lemma 1 in text.)  Since B A ⊂  and B A ′′ ⊂ , we have  () , TT s ϕ σ a  <  () , TT s ϕ σ ′′ a  
for s B ∈  and s B ′′ ∈ .  
 
Moreover, since for  () 0 T t σ >  impact function  t z  is increasing in attention level υ  we 






Vz t s σσ ϕ σ ′′ = ∫
a
aa () ds µ − 
() () () ,, tT TT
B




′ ∫ a () ds µ > () , tTT V σ a . 
This is a contradiction to the assumption that  T a  is an equilibrium audience allocation. 
Q E D.  
 
The rest of the appendix contains the proofs of the claims in the text. 
 
Proof of lemma 1. 




d σ λ ∫
a
 is a measurable 
function of s. Thus, for v measurable and bounded also the composition  () , s vs τ  is 
measurable and bounded. AN holds by construction. This proves that v represents 
attention capacities ϕ  satisfying AN. For the only if part define for ϕ  measurable and 
bounded  () , vs τ : =  () , TT s ϕ σ a . Then v is measurable and bounded and 
() () ,, TT s ss ϕ σν τ = a  by definition. QED. 
 
Proof of proposition 1. 
(a) Suppose  there  are , AA ′∈A with positive measure so that for all  , s A ∈   , s A ′′ ∈  
() , s vs τ  <  () , s vsτ ′ ′ ,  () , T Ms ′ =∅ a  and  () T s t ∈a  for some t. According to 
lemma A2,  () () 0 T At µ ′−= a  or  () () 0 T At µ ∩= a . The first clause implies that 
almost all s A ′′ ∈  belong to  () T t a  which contradicts  () , T Ms ′ =∅ a . The second 
clause contracts the assumption that all s A ∈  belong to  () T t a .  
(b) Suppose  there  are , AA ′∈A with positive measure so that  () , s vsτ ′ ′ <  () , s vs τ , 
() , T M sT ′ = a  and  () , T M sT ≠ a  for all s A ∈ ,  s A ′′ ∈ . According to lemma A1, 
() () 0 T At µ −= a  or  () () 0 T At µ ′∩= a  for all tT ∈ . However, the first clause  Attention  Economies    A3 
cannot hold for  () , T tTM s ∈− a , and the second clause contradicts 
() , T M sT ′ = a  for s A ′′ ∈ . 
(c)  Follows immediately from lemma A1. 
(d) Suppose  that  () () Tt tr µ < a . The divisibility property imposed on () ,, S µ A  
implies that a measurable set  () T AS t ⊂− a  exists with  () ( ) () tT Ar t µµ =− a . 
Let  T ′ a  be the audience allocation resulting from  T a  when  () T t a  is replaced by 
() () : TT tt A ′ =∪ aa. Since  () () , Tt T tr µ ′′ = aa  is a feasible deviation for t. 
Moreover, by targeting the unused radiation capacity  () () () T tt ρµ − a  on A, 
company t attracts additional attention implying  () () ,, tTT tTT VV σσ ′ > aa . (Note 
that  () 0 A µ >  and  () () ,0 tT zt συ >  for  () 0 T t σ > .) This is a contradiction to the 
assumption that  T a  is an equilibrium allocation.  
 
Sufficiency: Because of d), no company can increase the measure of its audience. Thus, 
according to AN,  () , tTT V σ a  can only be increased if t retargets its signals  () T t σ  from 
a measurable subset  () T At ⊂a  to a measurable subset  () T AS t ′⊂− a ,  () ( ) AA µµ ′ ≤ , 
so that  () () () () ,, tT s
A
z tv s ds στ µ ∫  < () () () () ,, tT s
A
z tv s ds στ µ
′ ∫ . This is only 
possible if there exist measurable  , B AB A ′′ ⊂⊂  with  () ( ) 0 BB µµ ′ =>  so that 
() ( ) ,, s s vs vs τ τ ′ ′ <  for almost all  , s Bs B ′′ ∈∈ . In sum, there must be  , B B′ with 
() () () 0, T Bt B µµ ∩= > a   () () 0 T Bt µ ′∩= a  and higher attention levels in B′ than 
B. This is in contradiction to condition (c). Thus no such deviation exists. QED. 
 
Proof of corollary 2. 
Take  , SS υ υ
−+  as defined in proposition 1. 
Step 1: Since  () () () ( ) { } min , T tt S µρ µ = a ,  () () tS υ ρµ
+ ≥  implies  () () 0 T tS υ µ
− ∩≠ a  
or  () () () T tS υ µµ
+ = a . This implies  () () 0 T St υ µ
+ −= a , according to proposition 1 (c). 
An analogous argument leads to  () () 0 T tS υ µ
− ∩= a  if  () () tS υ ρµ
+ < . 
Step 2: By definition,  () Sυ µ
+  is a non-increasing function of υ  starting at 
() () 0 SS µµ
+ =  and eventually reaching zero since ν  is bounded.  () () SS υ µµ
+ =  
implies that almost all subjects have at least attention level υ , whereas  () 0 Sυ µ
+ =  
means that almost all subjects have lower attention level than υ . Hence,  () , s s ν τυ
+ =  
for almost all s if and only if  () () SS υ µµ
+ =  for all υ υ
+ ≤  and  () 0 Sυ µ
+ =  for all 
υ υ
+ > . (The if part is obvious. For the only if part suppose that  () () 0 SS υ µµ
+ <<  for 
some  0 υ > . Then also  () 0 Sυ µ
− >  and  () ( ) ,, s s ss ν τυ ν τ ′ ′ ≥>  for  , s Ss S υ υ
+− ′ ∈∈ .)  Attention  Economies    A4 
Step 3: Suppose that property (a) in corollary 2 does not hold. Then, according to step 2, 
() () 0 SS υ µµ
+ <<  for some υ . Suppose that heterogeneity of radiation capacities is 
restricted so that either  () () tS υ ρµ
+ ≥  for all t or  () () tS υ ρµ
+ <  for all t. In the first 
case, step 1 implies  () () 0 T St υ µ
+ −= a  for all t and thus part (b) of the corollary holds 
for F Sυ
+ =   . In the second case, step 1 implies (c) with US υ
− =   . QED. 
 
Proof of fact 1.  
For  1, , , kK = …  define  () { } :m a x 1 , / kk nS µρ =  and  : k m = () () / kk Tr S λµ . By 
assumption,  k n  is a natural number. Decompose S  into  k n  subsets  ,1 , , ,
i
kk Si n = …  of 
equal size  ()
i




SS = ∪  and 
ij
k k SS ∩= ∅  for ij ≠ . Moreover, 
decompose  k T  into  k n  subsets  ,1 , ,
i
kk Ti n = … , of equal size  ()
i




TT = ∪  and 
ij
k k TT ∩= ∅  if ij ≠ . Then, the audience allocation  T a  defined by 
()
i
Tk tS = a  if 
i
k tT ∈  satisfies the following properties:  
(i)  () () Tk tr µ = a  for all tT ∈ . (ii) For any s S ∈  and  { } 1, , kK ∈ …  there is 
() { } ,1 , , k iks n ∈ … , so that  () , iks
k sS ∈ . Moreover,  ()
() , ,
iks





td t τσ = ∫
a




T σλ ∑  =  kk
k
m σ ∑ . Thus, for all 
() ,, s kk
k
s vs f m τσ  = ∑ 

. Property (i) guarantees that no company can increase its 
impact by increasing the size of its audience and property (ii) implies equal attention 
levels. Thus, according to corollary 1,  T a  is an equilibrium. QED. 
 
Proof of proposition 2. 
Suppose that there are two audience allocations 
12 , TT aa  with the required properties, i.e. 
() ,
i
s i vs τ υ =    for some constant  i υ    and 
i
s s τ τ
+ ≥ , where  ()





td t τσ = ∫
a
,  1,2 i = . 
Suppose  12 υ υ ≠    , say  21 υ υ <    . Then, because of DA, 
12
s s τ τ <  for almost all s. This 




ds ds τµ τµ > ∫∫ , in contradiction to lemma A1 (c), according to which 
() s
S
ds X τµ = ∫  for any allocation  T a  with  () () T t µ a () ( ) { } min , , St t T µρ =∈ . 
Hence, for any given  12 , X υ υυ =≡      . Define  () X υ υ =   . Suppose next that 
() , ttT ρ ∈ , or  T σ  change, so that  X  increases to  X′. Let  , TT ′ aa  be audience 
allocations with the required properties (i.e.  () () () () , Tt Tt tr tr µµ ′′ == aa ,  s s τ τ
+ ≥ , 
s s τ τ
+ ′ ≥ ,  () , s vs τ υ =   ,  () , s vs τ υ ′′ =   , where notation is analogous to before).  X X ′>   Attention  Economies    A5 
implies  () () ss
SS
ds ds τµ τµ ′ > ∫∫  and thus  s s τ τ ′ >  on a set  AS ⊂  with positive measure. 






Proof of proposition 3. 
(a) By  definition,  () ( ) () ()( ) ,
n
tT t t Vt z c σµ σ υ σ =− a , if  () , s vs τ υ =  for almost all s. 




















  The assumptions in (4.1) and (4.3) guarantee that the equation has a solution and 
implicitly defines  () () ()
* ,0 tT t σµ υ > a  with 
*/0 t σµ ∂∂ >  and 
*/0 t συ ∂∂ ≥ . The 
second-order condition  / 0 F σ ∂∂ <  holds because of 
22 /0 t z σ ∂∂ <  and  0 t c′′ ≥ . 
(b)  According to (a), we have  () ()
* n
t V σ ⋅= () () T t µ a () ()
* , tt z συ ⋅−   () ()
*
tt c σ ⋅ . 
Applying the envelope theorem, we obtain  /0
n
tt Vz µ ∂∂ = >  and 
() () // 0 .
n
tT t Vt z υµ υ ∂∂ = ∂ ∂ > a  QED. 
 
Proof of lemma 2. 
For  () () 0, , s vs υτ
+ ∈ , the equation  () , vs τ υ =  defines for all s signal exposure 
() , s s τ υτ
+ >  where  () , s τ υ  is differentiable in υ  with  /0 τ υ ∂∂ < . Thus,  () ,
S
s ds τυ ∫  is 
a differentiable and decreasing function of υ . Since  () ,,
S
s ds X τυ = ∫  according to 
lemma 1, υ  is a differentiable decreasing function of X. 
 
According to the proof of proposition 3, for given  () () ,, T t µ υ a  optimal signal strength 
() () ()
* , tT T t σµ υ a  is determined by the first-order condition 













a  Since  /0 F σ ∂∂ < , 
*
t y σ ≤  if and only if 
() ,0 Fty≤  for any  y + ∈  . Thus,  () { } T tt y σ ≤=   () { } ,0 tF ty ≤  which is a 
measurable set, if the functions  () ( ) :, / t at z συ σ =∂ ∂  and  () ( ) : t bt c σ ′ =  are 
measurable. QED. 
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Proof of theorem 2. 
Only the impact on  []
* , T X Tr  has to be proved. The effect on 
*
T υ  follows from DA 
when  s τ
+  is not larger than  s τ  for almost all s. According to proposition 3, 
() ()() () ()
** ,, tt t rX t X συ σ ρυ >    for all  0 tT ∈ . (Note  t r =   () ( ) { } min , St µρ     () t ρ > .) 
This implies  () () ,, ,, , TT Z XTr Z XTr >    where Z is defined in (4.6). Since  /0 ZX ∂∂ ≤ , 
the equilibrium level  X    defined by the equation  () ,, T Z XTr X =       is higher than the 
level defined by  () ,, T Z XTr X = . QED. 
 
Proof of fact 2. 
Let  T a  be the audience allocation constructed in the proof of fact 1. Chose υ  and τ  
such that  () f υ τ =  and  
 
() () ( )
21 1






= ∑ . (A.1) 
Then for  k tT ∈ : 
  () () () 10 ln
nk k
tk k k Vr g hc c συ σ υ σ =+ − −    (A.2) 
and argmax 
* n
tk V σ =  where  
  ()
*1 / kk k k rg c συ = . (A.3) 
 
For  s τ τ = , lemma A1, part (c), implies  () ( ) tt
T
Sr t d t µτ σ =∫   () kk k
k







=  with  () kk k
k
X rT σλ =∑ . (A.4) 
Substituting 
*
k σ  for  k σ  we get (A.1) with  () f υ τ = . Thus,  ()
*,, Tk tt T σσ =∈  is an 
equilibrium under  T a . Obviously,  T a  is an equilibrium for  , T T σ  since  () , T vs υ = a  for 
all s and  () () Tt tr µ = a  for all tT ∈ .  
 
For proving (ii), note that in any equilibrium with equalized attention levels we must 
have  () , s f τ ττ υ ==  and  () () , Tk k tr t T µ =∈ a . Thus, (A.3) and (A.4) hold. They 
imply equation (A.1). Since  () f υ τ = , 0, f ′≤  0 k g′ ≥ , this equation implicitly defines 
τ  as a function  () () ()
*
11 ,, ,,, kk TT τ λλ ρρ ……  with  ()
*/0 k T τλ ∂∂ >  and 
()
* /0 0 k τρ ∂∂ >=  if  () k S ρµ < ( () S µ ≥ , respectively). (Substitute 
() { } min , kk rS µρ =  into (A.1).) (Moreover,  ()
* τ ⋅  is lower (higher) in an economy of 
size  () ( ) SS µµ ′ <  if  () () () , respectively kk SS ρµ ρµ <≥  for all  1, , . kK = … ) QED. 
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Proof of theorem 3. 
Suppose that  **
** ,,, 1 , 2 ,
ii
i TT Ti σ = a  are free-entry equilibria with equilibrium attention 
levels  () *
** :
i ii T X υυ = , respectively. For simplifying notation, set  *
* :
i




tt i σσ υ = , for any tL ∈ . Moreover, denote by 
i
s τ  signal exposure of s in 
equilibrium i and define  ()
** *







X rd t rd t σσ
∩
=+ ∫∫ ,  







X rd t rd t σσ
∩
=+ ∫∫ . 
Assume that  () ()
**
11 1 222 X X υυ υυ =< =. (Since indices 1 and 2 can be exchanged, the 
following contradiction also applies to  21 υ υ < , which establishes  12 υ υ = .) Note first 








tt tt t VVV συ συ ≥>≡ , for any tL ∈ . 
(The first inequality follows from the definition of 
i
t σ  as the optimal choice under  i υ . 
The second inequality follows from  // 0
n
tt t Vr z υυ ∂∂ = ∂ ∂ > , see proposition 3.) I show 
that   12 υ υ <  and 
21 *
1 , tt VV t T >∈ , lead to a contradiction: 
(i)  On the one hand, since DA with  ()
i
s s ττ
+ ≥  is assumed,  12 υ υ <  implies 
12
s s τ τ >  




ds ds τµ τµ > ∫∫ . Thus, according to lemma A1, 
**
12 X X > . 
(ii)  On the other hand, viability of 
*
1 tT ∈  requires 
1 0 t V ≥  so that 
21
tt VV >  implies 
2 0 t V > . Hence, 
**
12 TT ⊂ , 
**
12 2 1 ,. B BTT =∅ = −  Moreover, for all 
***
112 tT T T ∈=∩, 
12
tt σσ ≤  because of  /0
i
t συ ∂∂ ≥  (see proposition 3). 
Combining this with (A.5), we conclude 
**
12 X X ≤ . This contradicts (i). 
Finally,  12 υ υ =  for all s implies 
12
s s τ τ =  and thus 
*




ds ds X τµ τµ == ∫∫ . 
QED. 
 
Proof of lemma 3. 
(a) The first-order condition defining  ()
*
t συ  is  () , F συ ≡  () ,/ tt rzσυ ∂  
() 0 t c σσ ′ ∂− =. Since 
** /0 , tt F σσ σ ′ ∂∂ < ≥, if t is non-inferior to t′. 
**
tt σσ ′ > , if 
t superior to t′. Thus, t superior to t′ is sufficient for 
**
tt tt rr σσ ′′ > . It is also 
necessary: Suppose t is not superior to t′. Then t is identical to t′ or t′ is superior 
to t, which would imply 
**
tt tt rr σσ ′′ ≤ . 
(b) By  definition,  () () ( )
** * ,,
n
tt t t t t t Vr z c συ συ σ =− . According to (a), 
**
tt tt rr σσ ′′ >  
implies  t is non-inferior to t′ and (i)  tt rr ′ > , or (ii)  // tt zz σσ ′ ∂∂ > ∂∂  or (iii)  Attention  Economies    A8 
tt cc ′ ′′ < . In case (i) 
nn
tt VV ′ >  (evaluated at the respective arguments) follows from 
the assumption that non-inferiority implies  tt z z ′ ≥  and  tt cc ′ ≤ . In the cases (ii), 
(iii), it follows from non-inferiority of t and the assumption that (ii) implies 
tt z z ′ >  and (iii) implies  tt cc ′ < . QED. 
 
Proof of theorem 4. 
(a)  Suppose that there are two equilibria 
**
12 , TT  with  () ()
**
12 TT λλ <  and thus 
() () 12 0 B B λλ ≤<, where  ()
** *
12 : ii B TT T =− ∩ . According to theorem 2, 
*
12 υ υυ ==, and thus 
** 1 2
12 , tt t XX σσ σ == ≡ ,  ()()
* ,,
ni n
tt i tt VV συ συ =  for any 
tL ∈ . (Notation as in proof of theorem 3.) This implies  
   ()
** ,0
n
tt t VV συ ≡=  for  12 tB B ∈∪. (A.6) 
 (Note  that 
**
1122 , B TB T ⊂⊂  imply  ()
* ,0
n
tt V συ ≥  for  12 tB B ∈∪. But since 
* , ji BT ∩= ∅   ()()
* ,, , 0
nn i
tt tt i ij V V συ συ ≠= ≤  if  j tB ∈ .) 
  Moreover, according to (A.5),
**
12 , X X =  
12





rd t rd t σσ = ∫∫ . (A.7) 
 Since  () () 12 B B λλ < , equation (A.7) can only hold if  () ,0 ii i BB B λ ⊂> , exist 
so that  tt tt rr σσ ′′ >  for  12 , tBt B ′ ∈∈ . Thus, according to 
()()
** ,, , 0
nn
tt tt MV V συ συ ′′ >≥  for  11 , tB B ∈⊂   22 tB B ′∈⊂, in contradiction to 
(A.6). 
(b) 
* tT ′∈  implies 
* 0 t V ′ ≥ . According to lemma 3 (a), t superior to t′ implies t is 
more powerful than t′ and thus, according to 
** ,0 tt MV V ′ >≥ . Hence, 
* tT ∈ . 
QED. 
 
Proof of theorem 5. 
Theorem 3 and 4 guarantee that unique values for equilibrium attention 
*,, υ υ    aggregate 
signal imission 
*,, X X    and measures  () ()
* , TT λλ    of the set of active companies exist 
in the two equilibria. 
(a) Assume  that 
* υ υ <   : Denote  () ()( ) ,: ,
n
tt t t Vr z c συ συ σ =−         and 
() : t συ=   argmax () ,
n
t V συ   . Then,  () () ,
n
ttt VVσυυ ≡>           () ()
** ,
n
tt V συ υ     , since 
// 0
n




tt V συ υ       () ()
** * ,
n
tt V συ υ ≥     () ()
** ,*
n
tt V συ υ ≥  
*
t V ≡ . (The first 
inequality follows from the definition of  t σ    as the optimal choice under 
n
t V   . The 
second inequality follows from  () () ,,
nn
tt VV συ συ ≥    by construction (b   was 
assumed to be a progress over  ) b . In sum, 
*
tt VV >    for all tL ∈ . According to the  Attention  Economies    A9 
proof of theorem 3, 
** , tt VVt T >∈    and 
* υ υ <   lead to a contradiction. (Note that 
the argument did not rely on the underlying fundamentals.) Thus, 
* υ υ ≥   . This 
proves part (a). 
(b)  (i) By construction, for all tE ∈ ,  () ()
*
tt συ συ >    and  () tt rσυ    >  ()
*
tt rσυ  for any 
υ . Moreover, for  () ,,
n
t tE Vσυ ∈   () , tt rz συ =      
( ) () ()( ) ,,
n
tt t t t cV r z c σσ υσ υ σ −> = −    for any  , συ. For  , tLE ∈−  
() () () ()
** , t t tt tt rr συ συ συ συ ==      and  () ,
n
t V συ     () ,
n
t V συ = . 
 (ii)  Assume 
* υ υ =  : Then, 
* X X =    (employ argument at the end of proof of 
theorem 3). According to (i),  () ()() ()
* ,,
nn
tt tt VV συυ συυ ≥        () ()
* ,
n
tt V συυ >  for 
all  tE ∈ . Thus, 
* E TT ⊂∩    since 
* E T ⊂  by assumption. Moreover, for all 
* , tt t σσ ≥    (I omit the argument 

















rd t rd t σσ > ∫ ∫
 
   ,   (A.8) 
 where  ()
** * : B TT T =−∩    and  ()
* : B TT T =− ∩     . 
 For 
*, tB t B ′ ∈∈   , we have: 
  
*
tt tt rr σσ ′′ ≥    . (A.9) 
 (Suppose  that 
*
tt tt rr σσ ′′ <    . Then,  tt tt rr σσ ′′ <      , because of (i) and 
() () ,,
nn
tt tt VV συ συ ′′ >        due to M . Thus tT ∈   , since tBT ′∈⊂    . This contradicts 
* BT ∩= ∅   .) Using (A.9) in (A.8), we obtain  () ()
* B B λλ >    and thus 
() ()
* TT λλ >   . 
 (iii)  Assume 
* : υ υ <    Then,  () () () ()
* ,,
nn
tt tt VV συυ συυ =           < 
() () ( ) ()
** * * * ,, 0
nn
tt tt VV συυ συ υ ≤≤    for every  () ()
*
0 tTE L T ∈−∪ − . (The first 
equality follows from tE ∉ . The next two inequalities follows for any tL ∈  from 
/0
n
t V υ ∂∂ >  and the optimality of  ()
**
t συ. The last inequality holds for any 
()
*
0 tT LT ∈∪− .) Thus, 
() () ()() ()
**
00 , T E LT LT LT T E LT λλ λ −∪− ⊂ − − ≥ −+ −    , > ()
* L T λ −  
and  () ()
* TT λλ <   , since  () 0 0 TE λ −>  by assumption. QED. 
 
Proof of fact 3. 
(a)  Suppose that the set of active senders is T  with  () T λ . Applying (A.2) and (A.3), 
we get  ()
*
t rg συ =  and 
*
t V =  ()0 ln 1 yy y c γ +− − for  () yr g υ ≡ . Thus,  Attention  Economies    A10 
* ,, 0 V >=<  if  () () 0 ,, , rg y c υγ >=<  where  () , o ycγ  is defined by the condition 
0 ln 1 / yc y γ =−+ . (Note that  1 y >  and  y  increases with  0 c  and decreases with 
γ .) According to (A.1),  ()
2 / rg τ υλµ =  where λ  denotes  () T λ  and µ  denotes 
() S µ . Using this and  () 0 gg
α υ υ =  in  () , ss vs
β ττ
− =  we get 
()
() () 1/ 1 1/ 1 *2
0 / rg
αβ αβ τλ µ
+ + = , 
** β υτ
− =  and  ()






   
with  () 1/ 1
0 0 gg
αβ + ≡   . Substitution of  ()
* g υ  into the condition 
* ,, 0 V >=<  gives us 
for  () () () ( ) 1/ **
0 TS r
αβ αβ λλ λ µ




+ ≡   . 
(b)  Local diversity depends on the realised audience allocation. For the equilibrium 
audience allocation constructed in the proof of fact 1, the measure of membership 
of every s S ∈  is given by  ()
** / mr S λµ = . Since all active senders are identical, 
attention level must be equalized in any equilibrium audience allocation. 
Moreover, equal attention levels imply an equal measure of membership for all 
s S ∈ . Hence,  ()
** / mr S λµ =  in any equilibrium. Substituting 
()() ( ) 1/ *
0 Sr
αβ αβ λλ µ
− =  into  ()
** / mr S λµ =  we get  () 1/ *
0 mr
αβ λ = . QED. 
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